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Again.  I would like to begin.  Again.  I would like to begin.  Again.  I would like to begin.  Again. 
I would like to begin.  Again.  I would like to begin.  Again.  I would like to begin. 
And again.  I would like to begin.  Again.  I would like to begin.  Again I would like to begin. And again. 
I would like to begin.  Again and again.  I would like to begin.    I would like to begin again and again. 
And again. I would like again to begin.  I would like again to begin and again.  I would like to begin again. 
I would like to begin again with these words. With these words: I would like to begin again. With these 
words I would like to begin again. With these words I would like to begin. I would like to begin with 
these words. I would like to begin by having already begun.  I would like to begin again but I am 
repeating myself with these words I am repeating myself again I would like to begin again. 
But I am repeating myself. With these words I am repeating myself again.  I begin by repeating myself. 
I begin by repeating myself.   I would like to begin by repeating myself.   I begin by repeating myself. 
I would like to begin something new by repeating these words but I am repeating myself again. 
I would like to begin something new by repeating these words but I am repeating myself again. 
I would like to begin something new by repeating these words but I am repeating myself again.  
I would like to begin something new by repeating these words but I am repeating myself again. 
Begin with these words to begin with these words to begin with these words to begin with these words.  
The word begins the word begins again the word begins again the word begins again the word begins. 
Again the word begins again.  The word begins in the beginning of a word. The word begins again.  
Again the word begins in the beginning of a breath begins with a quiver in the throat, the word  
begins again before the thought begins in a flutter of air, a flutter in the chest, a touch of soft breeze 
against feathered tissue like a glance through a curtain or a bird practising for flight. What is it?   
I glance up.  What is it? A curtain.  What is it?  A window.  What is it?  A bird.  What is it? 
What is it.  What is it. What is it.  A flutter: What is it. What is it. What is it.  What is it that begins?  
What is it what is it what is it. A-flutter. What is it what is it what is it.    What is it that begins to move? 
 What is it?  What is it that begins?  What is it that begins to move?  What is it that begins to move me? 
I would like to begin again. I would like to begin again by repeating these words.  These words again. 
Imagine that I am here in front of you, and that my mouth begins to open and close to let air in and out, 
and that the air expands against my thoughts until they have nowhere else to go, and that they are 
pushed out onto my tongue into these words. Again.  These words. Again. How do I begin? 
Again. Imagine that I am saying these words: How do I begin? How do I choose the words to begin? 
I begin by choosing. I begin by choosing these words again. These words I always would have chosen 
because these are the words with which I begin.  I begin by choosing what I always would have chosen.  
If these are my words and if there could ever be such a thing as my words then I would always choose 
to begin this way, with these words again.  I begin by choosing these words to begin again by repeating 
these words again, and so I begin with choice already being something which chooses me. What is it? 
What is it? What is it that chooses? What is it that begins?  What is it? What is it that begins as I begin? 
I begin inside someone else’s body, and that body has already begun performing. 
New York, April 1975.  
I would like to begin. 
  
I would like to begin with the idea of ‘readiness 
potential’, a phenomenon discovered in the 
1960s at the University of Freiburg, where 
neurologists Hans Helmut Kornhuber and Lüder 
Deecke teased out from close analyses of 
electroencephalograms the observation that 
voluntary acts of movement are accompanied 
by a detectable shift in the electric potential of 
the brain.  That is: there is a brain twitch that 
accompanies a finger twitch.  Maybe no 
surprise there.   
But in a later series of experiments, Benjamin 
Libet (1985) demonstrated a more complicated 
set of interrelations.  In one of his well-known 
(and somewhat contested) experiments, 
subjects were asked to watch a rotating dot on 
a kind-of clock, to decide at an arbitrary time to 
move their finger (which was recorded 
mechanically), and at the same time to note the 
time on the clock when they made their 
decision. Consistently, the time that the 
subjects noted the intention to move preceded 
the actual movement by two-tenths of a 
second.  This could be a measurement of the 
speed of thought – it takes two-tenths of a 
second between deciding to move and the 
body moving. 
Measurements of readiness potential, 
however, revealed a more surprising 
phenomenon.  They showed fluctuations in the 
brain an additional three-tenths of a second, 
and sometimes up to a whole second, before 
the time noted by the subject at which they 
were conscious of having made a choice.  That 
is, somewhere around half a second before you 
move your finger, some part of your brain 
begins to act.  But only later are you aware of 
your decision to move.  So the question is, who 
or what is it that has decided to move, if we only 
become conscious of the decision after it has 
already been made?   
The current scientific picture of the self depicts 
it as constituted by a multitude of different 
systems, wired to different parts of our bodies 
and our sensory experiences, sometimes 
working in sympathy but more often with 
conflicting impulses and agendas.  All of this 
takes place below the surface of consciousness; 
a thought begins before it is born, arising to 
consciousness out of a messy tangle of 
electricity and matter.  The most recent studies 
use magnetic resonance imaging in order to 
locate where these various impulses arise; they 
note that different parts of the brain are 
activated when subjects are asked to pay 
attention to the urge to move, rather than to 
the movement itself.  It is not as simple as cause 
and effect, and no clear explanation exists.  One 
hypothesis is that there is a modelling centre 
within the brain that takes copies of impulses 
sent to the muscles and starts to imagine their 
outcomes – but we aren’t even aware of this 
(Eagleman 2004, 1145).  Or perhaps 
intentionality itself is something we 
retrospectively invent; in the words of David 
Eagleman, it is ‘an illusion arising from watching 
yourself […] make actions (1146). Elsewhere, 
Eagleman writes, ‘The conscious mind is not at 
the center of action in the brain; instead, it is 
far out on a distant edge, hearing but whispers 
of activity’ (2011, 16).  We are, it might be said, 
unreliable spectators getting only a partial 
glimpse of the show. 
 
I begin by listening to whispers. 
 
What is the readiness potential of the theatre?  
In this kind of set-up we often find ourselves in 
a strange temporality.  We describe the way we 
begin the process of making performance with 
the word ‘rehearsal’, as if we are looking back 
at a previous action, a repetition, a re-
enactment, even as we look forward to an 
event that does not yet exist.  We recollect 
forward while remembering backward.  We 
rehearse the future into being. But how can you 
rehearse something that doesn’t yet exist?  Or 
might it be that it already exists – here, waiting, 
in the readiness potential of these rooms we 
call ‘rehearsal rooms’?  Of these bodies, of our 
histories and the histories that came before us?  
In this ‘blank’ space?  
 
If I close my eyes here I imagine that I can hear 
you breathing. 
Before they disbanded, the performance 
company Goat Island used to announce on the 
front page of their website, ‘We have 
discovered a performance by making it.’  In The 
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Lastmaker (2007), their final performance, 
Karen Christopher re-enacts, but also practises 
as if in rehearsal, a stand-up routine that 
references Lenny Bruce and George Carlin.  
‘There’s a moment coming,’ she says.  ‘It’s not 
here yet.  It’s on the way.  It’s still in the future.’  
She waits. I wait.  We wait.  ‘Here it is!  Oh, it’s 
gone.’  Around and around it goes, as we try to 
catch up with ourselves, listening, waiting, on a 
distant edge.   
Again. 
Another performance piece called In Eldersfield 
– Chapter One (2011), devised by the company 
Kings of England, structures itself around an 
absent present.  Subtitled Elegy for Paul Dirac, 
it positions itself in relation to an anecdote 
about Dirac, one of the pioneers of quantum 
mechanics, and someone who was probably 
somewhere on the autistic spectrum.  Where 
are you going on your holidays? he was asked 
by a laboratory colleague, the story goes.  
Twenty minutes later – after twenty minutes of 
silence – he replied, 
Why do you want to know? 
At the centre of their performance piece, Kings 
of England stage, or re-stage, this silence.  The 
colleague’s question is asked.  And then the 
performers do nothing.  They wait.  I wait.  We 
wait.  The audience fidgets.  There are constant 
patters of whispering, like rainfall, fluttering in 
the room.  I hear stifled laughter that at first 
sounds like weeping.  Bodies begin to leave the 
room: noisy, quick, awkward.  A person behind 
me whispers loudly to a companion: ‘This is 
some kind of performance art thing.  And I’m 
not going to buy into it.  I’m not going to stay 
here.  I’m not going to be a part of it.’    She 
continues to whisper complaints like this for the 
duration of the silence, and is still doing so 
when the silence is ended.   
In what time, what kind of time, does this 
silence take place?  It represents another 
silence, doubles it, refers to it, reflects it, in the 
way that all theatrical gestures do; and it also is 
a silence, palpably, uncomfortably, in the here 
and now.  At the beginning of the piece, 
performer Simon Bowes says, ‘We are gathered 
here to stage Dirac’s most notorious silence, 
not to close it, but to hold it open – in an 
invocation.’  What is it to hold open a hole 
within a performance, and what does that hole 
enfold within it?  For I am acutely aware of 
being enclosed within it, what it sounds like, 
what it feels and tastes like, what it’s like to 
have my body held within in – and so is my 
neighbour with the noisy whisper.  Even as she 
refuses to be a part of it, she is part of it.  In this 
way, we might think of performance as being 
that which attempts to hold that within which 
it is itself held. 
 
Why do you want to know? 
 
These words that you are reading now, that you 
might imagine filling my mouth – what is it that 
they are held within?  When did these thoughts 
begin?  In the 1970s, the Tisch School of the 
Arts at NYU began a new MFA programme in 
dance.  You didn’t need to have any dance 
training to be part of this programme.  In fact it 
was a bit of a disadvantage.  That wasn’t the 
kind of potential they were looking for.  You 
would be taught by people like Tricia Brown or 
Steve Paxton or David Gordon.  Your ‘teaching’, 
such as it was, might consist of walking in circles 
around the room; rolling around in loose 
clothing; listening to records.   
This is my mother, the figure in mid-air, before 
she knew she would be a mother.   
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But I cannot look at this image without seeing 
this as part of my story.  She is looking at me, 
through me, like me, ahead to me, back to me. 
 
This is my father, behind the piano, before he 
knew he would be a father. 
Later, they moved out of New York.  I grew up 
elsewhere.  I didn’t know about any of this.  I 
didn’t know that my parents were there when 
Einstein on the Beach played the Metropolitan 
Opera House in 1976, or that they saw 
Meredith Monk’s opera in the Wooster Street 
carpark in 1972, or that they were at an early 
reading of Spalding Gray’s first monologue.  I 
didn’t know about any of this.   
And here I am now.   
With these words: here I am now. 
 
What is the readiness potential of the theatre?  
When does a movement begin? It begins 
before it begins, with the hum of the room and 
the colour of the floor and the texture of the 
door. It can be fixed here.  These things hold it 
up, hold it forward, let it lean out into space, 
precarious, but bound. An imagined finger 
twitches.  A different finger responds.  My 
mother leaps there.  I land here. What holds 
two moments together? What makes them 
part of the same event?   
Here, it’s the past, still walking around inside 
me.  
Out there, it’s you, reading these words as the 
light changes around you.  
 
What is it?  
What is it that moves us to act?   This is the 
question pursued by Susan Sontag across her 
book-length essay, Regarding the Pain of 
Others (2003), in which Sontag criticizes two 
different responses we might have when faced 
with images of suffering.  On the one hand, she 
is concerned about the extent to which we 
might become numb to such images, 
anaesthetized against any response.  She 
argues against the rise of an overly aesthetic 
perspective that cynically accepts the 
diminishing effectiveness of the image in a 
society saturated with spectacle.  She writes, 
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Critics of modernity, consumers of 
violence as spectacle, adepts of 
proximity without risk, are schooled 
to be cynical about the possibility of 
sincerity.  Some people will do 
anything to keep themselves from 
being moved. (99) 
But Sontag is equally concerned about the 
opposite reaction, one that overly identifies 
with the reality of the suffering being 
represented.  Here the problem is not avoiding 
being moved, but instead being moved – and 
having an emotional or sympathetic response – 
as yet another way of avoiding the implications 
of the image.  She writes, 
The imaginary proximity to the 
suffering inflicted on others that is 
granted by images suggests a link 
between the faraway sufferers […] 
and the privileged viewer that is 
simply untrue, that is yet one more 
mystification of our real relations to 
power.  So far as we feel sympathy, 
we feel we are not accomplices to 
what caused the suffering.  Our 
sympathy proclaims our innocence as 
well as our impotence. (91)  
This tension runs throughout the book, making 
it difficult to tell if Sontag thinks there could 
ever be an appropriate response to 
representations of suffering that is anything 
other than direct action against the causes of 
violence.  She seems to suggest that part of the 
difficulty of having an ‘appropriate’ response to 
images of suffering is that there is not an 
appropriate place for that response to happen, 
no place where the images do not become 
bound up in other concerns – trying to sell us 
something, or competing with distractions, or 
part of a commentary about art.   
But at the end of the book, Sontag finishes with 
an unexpected example of a representation of 
violence and suffering that might escape these 
dilemmas.  She writes about a highly stylized 
work by Jeff Wall, called Dead Troops Talk (A 
Vision After an Ambush of a Red Army Patrol 
near Moqor, Afghanistan, Winter 1986) (1992). 
It’s a large photographic mural that depicts 
thirteen dead or dying Soviet soldiers in a 
jagged landscape, the soldiers still actively 
conversing and joking with each other even 
though some of them are missing limbs or large 
sections of their skulls.   
The image is obviously staged; Wall never 
visited Afghanistan, and the image was 
produced in his studio through painstaking 
compositing of carefully produced images. And 
so it’s a surprising example for Sontag to finish 
with; its staged-ness, its theatricality, might 
seem to be only further away from the serious 
response that Sontag is looking for.  And yet, it 
might be exactly these theatrical elements that 
are most relevant.  Sontag writes, ‘These dead 
are supremely uninterested in the living: in 
those who took their lives, in witnesses – and in 
us’ (113).  What is important is that nothing is 
asked of us by these figures, who, anyway, 
aren’t even real.  No action is possible – the only 
thing left to do is to look.  If Regarding the Pain 
of Others asks what the appropriate response is 
to images of suffering, then maybe the clue is 
in the title: to regard, and nothing more. 
Philosopher Stanley Cavell argued something 
similar in his essay on King Lear and the value 
of tragedy (2002 [1967]).  Writing during the 
Vietnam War, Cavell was troubled about the 
way that we theatricalize others when we turn 
them into characters in our own story, even if it 
is only a story about our own helplessness – and 
we also theatricalize ourselves when we 
abdicate our responsibilities in order to avoid 
being recognized for who we are.  But the 
theatre, paradoxically, is where we might be 
free of this theatricality.  It is the place where 
nothing is required of you but to watch and to 
listen, where your own inaction is already 
accounted for, where the story is not yours and 
that is why you came here.  It is a place to 
practice – indeed, to rehearse – your regard for 
others.  Cavell puts it this way: 
Why do I do nothing, faced with tragic 
events?  If I do nothing because I am 
distracted by the pleasures of 
witnessing this folly, or out of my 
knowledge of the proprieties of the 
place I am in, or because I think there 
will be some more appropriate time 
to act, or because I feel helpless to 
undo events of such proportion, then 
I continue my sponsorship of evil in 
the world, its sway waiting upon these 
forms of inaction.  I exit running.  But 
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again 
I would like to begin again with these words. 
I would like to begin by having already begun.   
I begin by repeating myself. 
but I am repeating myself again. 
 I begin to feel another inside me. It flutters and 
quivers and moves my heart to a place higher in 
my chest than it would normally be 
When another touches me, the touch has 
already begun from inside, with a chemical rush 
that follows an imagined host to the surface 
long before our skin actually meets in mid-air 
What is it? 
What is it that began? 
What is it that begins with me? 
 
My father’s eyes swim in my mother’s tears 
 and my own gaze looks back at me  
through an open doorway. 
 
This is the beginning. 
This is the beginning of a fire. 
This is the beginning of a fire  
that started before I was born.   
And my body is the fuel. 
 
 
 
 
if I do nothing because there is 
nothing to do, where that means that 
I have given over the time and space 
in which action is mine and 
consequently that I am in awe before 
the fact that I cannot do and suffer 
what it is another’s to do and suffer, 
then I confirm the final fact of our 
separateness.  And that is the unity of 
our condition. (339) 
Take a moment now to open the doors to the 
room you are in.  
Re-reading Cavell, I pause to look out the 
window, a flutter, and I am reminded of 
another performance by Karen Christopher.  In 
her duet with Gerard Bell called So Below 
(Haranczak/Navarre 2012), the doors to the 
playing space are kept open throughout the 
show.  The performance itself has a quality that 
feels ‘everyday’: there’s a gentleness and an 
absence of pretence to Karen’s and Gerard’s 
actions, their fragments of speech, their small 
acts of kindness, and so there’s a pleasing 
harmony with the quotidian sounds that seep 
in from outside – at the theatre where I was in 
the audience, for example, I could tell that a 
conversation was taking place downstairs, even 
if I couldn’t tell what the conversation was 
about.  But watching them, I felt there was 
something more than just reality fluttering in, 
lending its unpredictability to the events in the 
room.  For theirs was a performance made out 
of careful attention – attention that went into 
the accumulation of events and actions that 
they ‘rehearsed’ as they discovered the 
performance by making it, and careful 
attention throughout their performing of the 
work – attention to voice and posture and 
stillness and balance – and also attention in the 
act of viewing, the activity with which I myself 
was engaged.  And so with the doors open, I felt 
not only the outside everyday seep in, but this 
careful attention work its way out.  This precise 
awareness of my own awareness, of my own 
remove from it, of the way I come late to my 
own thoughts and am making them, even now, 
through discovering them.   
The word Cavell might use for this awareness is 
acknowledgement. 
 
I would like to begin    
I would like to begin again with these words. 
But I am repeating myself. 
I would like to arrive, here at the end, and find 
myself waiting for me 
I am trying to be here with you. 
But because my words are here for you  
They cannot be here with you. 
The problem is not so much that he cannot, so 
to speak, see over the present, but that he 
cannot insert a break in it; if hd narrates, then 
that is what he is doing, that has become what 
is now happening. (Cavell 2002: 335) 
What is it? 
What is it that begins? 
What is it that begins to move me? 
When I weep, it is not usually because I have 
chosen to weep, but I want to believe that it is I 
who is weeping.  
If it is not I, then who is it that begins to weep 
through me? 
Who am I to think that, if I care about you, we 
are connected, but that we are not connected 
if I choose not to care?  
My care is a symptom of our 
interconnectedness, and not its cause 
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